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Abstract   
One of the main obstacles to the current bureaucratisation trend in large professional service 
firms (PSFs) is the organic nature of professional knowledge production, sharing and use. 
Centralised knowledge management (KM) systems aimed at codifying “best practice” solutions 
to recurrent client questions for large-scale reuse are a common strategy increasingly employed 
to overcome this obstacle. Using a socio-ethnographic case study of a business law firm in Paris, 
this research examines whether the use of centralised KM systems in bureaucratised PSFs 
contributes to a shift in power from professionals to managers. More specifically are 
administrative controls over knowledge resources increasing, or do professionals retain power 
(i.e., some level of social and self-control) over knowledge production, sharing and use? The 
results of this study indicate that, far from losing ground, professionals’ social and self controls 
have been reinvented and reformed in a bureaucratised context.  
Keywords: Professional service firms (PSFs); bureaucratisation; knowledge management 
(KM) systems; organisational controls; organisational archetypes. 
 
Introduction 
After the early debates amongst sociologists about the real or purported distinctiveness of 
professional work (e.g., Freidson 1986), contemporary views have converged upon a recognition 
that all professions deal with human-related issues that are unique, complex and have uncertain 
outcomes (Champy 2009). That being so, it has been suggested that the systematic application of 
standardised knowledge to solve unique client problems (e.g., legal or medical issues) could be 
catastrophic. For example, in a healthcare setting, professionals need to take account of 
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specificities such as a patient’s medical history, their current medications and allergies, and the 
existence of alternative pathologies, before rendering a professional judgment; even the diagnosis 
of a well-known condition does not automatically lead to the prescription of a single “best 
practice” treatment. Such decisions necessarily involve uncertainty, risk taking and the adaptation 
of theoretical knowledge to a particular case, and it is this non-algorithmic quality of professional 
judgments which has been used to justify professionals’ claims for autonomy at work and the 
appropriateness of self/peer controls rather than enforced regulation.   
 
Established forms of professional governance and practice are, however, being 
undermined. As Olgiati (2008: 557) notes, recent economic trends have emphasised an alternative 
approach: “the knowledge-based economic model is rooted in rationalistic and universalistic 
principles about the existence of a best way. This implies a top down enforcement of best 
practices as formally, technically, standardised, specialised and certified according to the one-
dimensional logic of market imperatives”. This philosophy has fuelled the rise of first generation 
knowledge management (KM) systemsi which, from the late 1990s onwards, have made the 
centralisation and control of processes of knowledge production, sharing and use both easy and 
cheap (Hansen et al. 1999). Professional service firms (PSFs) have been enthusiastic adopters of 
such systems, not least because “successful professionalisation embodies a system of codification 
and standardisation of knowledge, which at the same time can be used as a strategy to control 
professionals [...]. It is in this respect that professionalism and the entrenched expert knowledge 
system may act as a host for governance practices” (Kuhlmann and Burau 2008: 624). 
 
Yet the knowledge-as-a-commodity vision advocated by the knowledge-based economic 
model and the first generation of KM systems challenges professionals’ long standing claims that 
their expertise is largely tacit and that quality professional judgement requires experience and 
acumen rather than the application of standardised solutions to known problems.  
 
Although the use (or non-use) of KM systems as decision support tools by professionals 
has been studied extensively, their use as managerial control devices is not well understood. 
Given the mood of growing distrust in professional judgements (Evetts 2006) and an increasing 
demand for transparent, accountable, and cost-efficient professional services (Kuhlmann and 
Burau 2008), this paper asks whether KM systems are contributing to the breakdown of the 
 3 
traditional “organic professional-knowledge nexus,” to borrow Olgiati’s (2006:533) expression. 
More specifically, do KM systems shift the balance of organisational power in PSFs’ towards 
administrators, thus reducing professionals’ social and self control over the production, sharing 
and use of codified knowledge? This paper seeks to answer this question by reporting an 
exploratory analysis of a case study in the Parisian office of a French business law firm, a 
member of an international multi-disciplinary practice providing legal, accounting, assurance and 
tax services. 
A recent shift towards more administrative controls in large PSFs 
 
Market and institutional pressures towards rationalised professional services  
 
The market for professional services is becoming more competitive and deregulated, 
notably in Europe where, in 2004, the European Commission initiated a dialogue with the 
professional bodies of lawyers, notaries, engineers, architects, accountants, tax advisors and 
pharmacists, and with national regulatory authorities, to eliminate some of the cross-border 
restrictions on professional practice (European Commission 2005):  
 
“The European Parliament [...] welcomes the dialogue between the Commission, the 
Member States and the professional bodies of professional services’ providers aimed at 
dismantling barriers to competition which are unjustified or harmful to the pursuit of the 
general interest and rules which are against the interests of consumers [...]”(European 
Parliament 2006) 
 
At the same time, recent financial scandals have challenged established notions of 
professional responsibility. As Evetts (2006:516) notes, “…doctors, lawyers, scientists and many 
others are treated with suspicion. […] An increasingly litigious culture, fuelled by knowledge of 
large financial gains from negligence cases in the USA, is further undermining trust and 
professionalism”. This climate of mistrust has created new discourses that emphasise 
transparency and objectivity, which are gradually replacing discourses of trust. Professionals are 
now required to be both transparent in their dealings with clients, and accountable for their 
performance (Kuhlmann and Burau 2008; Evetts 2006; Champy 2006). In particular, there is a 
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greater need to make explicit the ways in which they use evidence and existing knowledge. At the 
same time, professions are facing intense economic and institutional pressure to deregulate, 
rationalise and “managerialise” their activities. Such demand are not new (see, for instance, 
Porter 1995), but they have recently gained momentum, resulting in the application of new 
managerial regimes within a number of PSFs, and the integration of more explicit governance 
regimes into their organisational structure. 
 
In the legal field, Dezalay (1992: 18) describes large, bureaucratised law firms as “law 
factories”, which are manifestations of the supremacy of an American model over European legal 
craftsmanship: “because of the concentration of resources that these factories can mobilise, small 
practitioners have no choice but merge or disappear, as the international competition [in the 
market for legal services] intensifies.” Similarly, firms in the accountancy field have been moving 
away from the “Professional Partnership” (P2) organisational model (Greenwood et al. 1990) -
which is characterised by informal controls in favour of the “Managed Professional Business” 
(MPB) model (Cooper et al. 1996), where administrative controls are systematised (Greenwood 
et al. 1998). In the latter, controls are applied using management by objectives (MBO) techniques 
and explicit performance indicators (Dirsmith et al. 1997), such as partners’ annual fee 
generation, the reporting of billable hours, and the types of clients and engagements that should 
be given priority.  
 
The professional health care services field has been subject to a similar phenomenon. 
Studies by Ford and Angermeier (2008), Harrison and McDonald (2008), and Hunter (2006) 
document the standardisation of care, the rise of evidence-based medicine, and stricter clinical 
controls in hospitals: “[t]he new health policies of managerialism, markets and consumer ‘choice’ 
change the substance of governance in different ways. [...] One characteristic of the changes in 
governance is the increasing turn towards managerial steering and performance that in turn shifts 
power to the meso level of organisations and professions” (Kuhlmann and Burau 2008: 620 and 
624). 
 
In the following section, I describe the evolution of organisational controls in PSFs in the 




Organisational controls in PSFs 
 
Definition of “control” 
 
Control can be defined as a form of influence which is intentionally or unintentionally 
exerted by some individuals on themselves or on other individuals within a social group. This 
influence effectively limits the freedom of those upon which it is exerted (Lebas 1980). In an 
organisational setting, intentional control is exerted to ensure that members of an organisation act 
in a coordinated and cooperative fashion. However, as Lebas and Weigenstein (1986:261) point 
out, “while the necessity of control may be readily apparent, the route to control is less obvious. 
Every organisation elects some combination of input control coupled with output control, and 
defines a general approach to control which may be labelled ‘market,’ ‘rules’ or ’culture’ 
(although the approach is rarely a pure version, but is rather adulterated by elements of the above 
three means of control)”.  
 
Relevance of Hopwood’s (1974) typology of controls: social, administrative and self-
controls 
 
Other descriptions of control within organisations have focused on the influence of 
“markets”, “bureaucracies” or “clans” (Ouchi 1980); or have variously classified internal controls 
as “cybernetic” or “non-cybernetic” (Hofstede 1981); “cultural” or “bureaucratic” (Child 1984); 
“actions”, “results”, or “personnel”-oriented (Merchant 1982); or as based on “mutual 
adjustment” (Perrow 1967). A literature review undertaken by Chiapello (1996) identified six 
dimensions of organisational control: (1) the means of control (market, organisation, culture, or 
social relations); (2) control processes (cybernetic or non-cybernetic); (3) the time at which 
controls are performed (before, after or during action); (4) the controller’s identity (organisation, 
person, group, or self); (5) the subject of control (e.g., actions; results; individuals’ 
characteristics; the organisation’s objectives and strategy; organisational culture and context), and 
(6) the attitude of the person being controlled (moral commitment, “working the system”, or 
alienation). Dambrin (2005) later proposed two additional dimensions: the direction of control 
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(lateral, ascendant or descendant), and the instruments of control (observation and analysis, or 
orientation).  
 
Notwithstanding this plethora of dimensions and constructs, there is no complete or 
definitive typology of organisational controls. In this paper I adopt Hopwood’s (1974) model, 
which proposes that organisational control is the unpredictable result of three competing spheres 
of influence: “self-controls” - those informally exerted by each individual over his own 
behaviour; “social controls” - those mutually and informally exerted by group members upon 
other members’ behaviour; and (3) “administrative controls” - the intentional and formally 
exerted managerial power over subordinates’ behaviour. Although they often conflict, these three 
realms of influence are not mutually exclusive and can co-exist within an organisation, forming a 
dynamic, unstable equilibria of “contradictory tensions”.   
 
Hopwood’s (1974) typology of self, social and administrative controls is consistent with 
extant research examining the form and management of PSFs (e.g., Brock 2007; Cooper et al. 
1996; Greenwood et al. 1990; Greenwood and Empson 2003; Hinings et al. 1999; Malhotra and 
Morris 2009; Pinnington and Morris 2002, Von Nordenflycht 2007)ii, as well as sociological 
studies of organisations employing professionals (Scott 2004). These studies frequently examine 
the tension between formal control structures within PSFs, and informal structures such as social 
obligations and professional self-discipline. In addition, various organisational archetypes have 
been proposed to characterise the distinctive organisational and governance arrangements of PSFs 
which emphasise social and self governance rather than formal rules and other kinds of 
administrative control (see for example Scott’s (1965) “Autonomous and Heretonomous 
Professional Organisations”; Bucher and Stelling’s (1969) “Professional Organisations”; 
Litwak’s (1961) and Mintzberg’s (1979) “Professional Bureaucracy”; Mills et al.’s (1983) 
“Flexiform” or Greenwood, Hinings and Brown’s (1990) “Professional Partnership”). In the 
following section I set out the reasons why social and self-controls have traditionally been seen as 
appropriate in professional work settings.  
 
The growing emphasis on administrative controls in large PSFs 
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Professional work is frequently defined as “special,” with distinctive outputs and 
throughput processes, a view which has contributed to the legitimation of professionals’ demands 
for self- and social regulation, and their resistance to administrative controls (see, for instance, 
Wallace 1995). For example, one of the defining features of professional work is that the quality 
of “outputs” (Lebas and Weigenstein 1986) is difficult to define and to measure (Malhotra et al. 
2006), whether by clients, regulators, or even professionals themselves. Audit work, for example, 
is traditionally judged according to the independence and competence of the professionals who 
perform it (De Angelo 1981), qualities which can only be inferred but not measured. Given the 
intangibility of professional service quality, clients resort to imperfect assessment techniques, 
such as word-of-mouth recommendations based on organisations’ reputations (Greenwood et al. 
2005), media rankings, and positive press coverage (Karpik 1989). Commentators such as Child 
(1984), Hofstede (1981), Ouchi (1977) and Merchant (1982) have suggested that when the quality 
of outputs is not measurable, administrative controls over such outputs are counter-productive, or 
at best useless.  
 
Professional work is also characterised by an element of “co-production”, where clients 
work with professionals to varying extents in order to create outputs (Mills et al. 1983). Some 
organisation theorists have argued that because professionals are dependent upon a client’s 
willingness or ability to share key information relevant to the production process, they face a high 
degree of task uncertainty and that administrative controls over the “throughput” process are 
therefore irrelevant (Chapman 1997). 
 
Professionals’ production “technology” (Perrow 1967)iii is also incompatible with 
administrative controls. Professional work is frequently non-repetitive because many client 
questions are unique (Pinnington and Morris 2002), and is traditionally seen as depending more 
upon practitioners’ personal attributes such as their intuition, aptitude, experience and discretion 
(Abbott 1988; Freidson 1986) than on their compliance with predefined production standards. 
Professional work would thus qualify as “non-routine work” in Perrow’s view, to which 
administrative processual controls are ill-suited.  
 
Nonetheless, there is a growing emphasis upon administrative controls within professional 
organisations, particularly within the largest PSFs which emerged after several decades of 
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internal growth and a succession of mega-mergers (Cooper et al. 2007). As discussed previously, 
this trend for the direct regulation of professionals has also been encouraged by an institutional 
and regulatory environment that promotes bureaucratic control as a solution to the current 
confidence crisis in professional self-governance. 
 
Organic knowledge production, sharing and use in PSFs 
 
Another distinctive characteristic of professional work is the (partially) organic nature of 
its knowledge creation, sharing and use. Professionals cultivate a body of abstract and codified 
knowledge as a resource for addressing client problems, and apply that knowledge using 
discretionary judgment (Freidson 1986). Abbott (1988:40) refers to this significant component of 
professional work as “inference”iv, whereby abstract knowledge is linked with the particulars of a 
client’s problem or situationv. For example, doctors may allocate some aspects of a patient’s 
diagnosis and treatment to non-professionals, but the interpretation of diagnostic results and the 
treatment strategy - their inference - cannot be delegated to subordinates. Thus, although 
professional knowledge is often codified, its abstract features mean that its adaptation to specific 
questions is difficult to standardise and control, in opposition to the current bureaucratisation 
trend in PSFs.  
 
However, that is not to say that professional knowledge creation, sharing and use 
processes are identical across professions and PSFs. For example, in some small, collegial-style 
PSFs there is little or no attempt to “recycle” existing knowledge from one client assignment to 
another, and constant “reinvention of the wheel” is a source of professional pride (Robertson et 
al. 2003). In these firms, knowledge sharing is territorialised and restricted (Lazega 2001). In 
contrast, large PSFs such as the “Big Four” accounting firms may engage in “knowledge 
commodification”vi as a strategy to colonise new jurisdictions and practice areas (Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2001: 933). This relatively new approach to knowledge production, sharing and use 
is indicative of a shift towards a more inclusionary intra-organisational perspective, which 
contrasts with the territorial, exclusionary knowledge regimes of the past (Knorr Cetina 2006). 
 
When the first KM systems became available in the early 1990s, organisational 
knowledge was seen as any practice, experience or other know-how that had proved to be 
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valuable or effective, and might be applicable to other organisations (e.g., Nonaka 1994). Viewed 
as a commodity, knowledge was a “strategic intangible asset” which was sticky (Szulanski 2000), 
codifiable (Kogut and Zander 1992), and transferable (Grant 1996). Other commentators 
described it in terms of, inter alia, the level at which it was held (individual or collective) 
(Malhotra 2003); whether it existed in a tacit or explicit state (Polanyi 1969; Nonaka 1994); or 
the extent to which it was retained consciously or unconsciously (Polanyi 1967)vii. Specific 
systems also known as “people-to-document knowledge management systems” (Hansen et al. 
1999) emerged to manage the process of its creation, dissemination and use. Since then, this idea 
of knowledge as an asset has been challenged by a more existential view (Maturana and Verela 
1998), whereby knowledge is indissociable from the “knower”. So-called “second generation KM 
systems” are arguably more consistent with this alternative view, and are designed to encourage 
the development of communities of practice and to stimulate “knowing” experiences, rather than 
merely facilitating transfers of knowledge. 
 
The commoditisation of knowledge so that it can be managed and controlled embodies 
one of the many forms of bureaucracy; KM systems, however, are appealing to PSFs because 
they appear to offer a measure of operational transparency, particularly in light of the fact that 
these organisations are under increasing regulatory pressure to improve their accountability 
(Kuhlman and Bureau 2008; Olgiati 2008). Before KM systems were implemented “no one best 
way [was] predictable from the formal body of knowledge itself” (Freidson 1986: 217) because 
practitioners employed it inconsistently. New methods of knowledge dissemination, coordination, 
translation and reuse have since become commonplace, with numerous studies describing 
professionals’ acceptance or rejection of people-to-document KM systems as decision aids in the 
provision of services (e.g, Hsiao et al. 2006; Werr and Stjernberg 2003). Whilst such systems are 
a clear attack upon professionals’ long-established autonomy and discretion, their use as 
bureaucratic control devices intended to increase output standardisation, reduce litigation risks 
and improve cost efficiency has received scant academic attention. The purpose of this research is 
to find out whether the use of codified people-to-document KM systems in bureaucratised PSFs 
contributes to a shift in powerviii away from professionals (i.e., reduced exercise of social and 
self-controls over knowledge production, sharing and use) and towards managers (i.e., increased 
formal controls over knowledge production, sharing and use). 
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Methodology 
A number of prominent researchers have argued that qualitative research methodologies 
are best suited to investigations of phenomena or topics for which little or no previous theory 
exists (e.g., Barley 1990; Bouchard 1976; Eisenhardt 1989). For example, a grounded theory 
approach to connect data to existing and suggestive new theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) is 
appropriate for exploratory research questions where data is collected and analyzed ahead of the 
formation of hypotheses. Such an approach advocates the simultaneous gathering of rich and 
detailed data alongside its analysis a process known as “abduction” such that “data analyses often 
alternate and iterate with data collection processes” (Edmondson and McManus 2007: 1163). The 
analysis of material such as exploratory interviews, direct observations, archival data, and 
longitudinal observations is a pertinent research strategy because it allows a detached 
investigation of a topic, as well as providing the opportunity for triangulation.  
 
Given the lack of extant literature on the mutual influence of KM and organisational 
controls in PSFs (Ditillo 2004), an exploratory socio-ethnographic approach was adopted, and an 
abductive analysis undertaken. Organisational socio-ethnographies permit full immersion in the 
research field and involve the use of data collection and analysis procedures which follow 
grounded theory principles. In addition, the adoption of such an approach (see Beaud and Weber 
1997) implies the existence of the following: (1) intimate personal knowledge of the subjects of 
the study; (2) longitudinal rather than cross-sectional observation; and (3) sensitivity to the 
constructed nature of the research results. Although the research strategy excludes the possibility 
of generalizing the findings to other types of organisation or contexts, it is believed that this 
limitation is offset by the study’s ability to provide insights into an organisational process which 
is not well understood, thereby providing directions for future research. 
 
The research field 
 
This study investigates the behaviour of business lawyers when creating, sharing and 
using professional knowledge. According to Robertson et al. (2003: 835), professionals operating 
in the legal field resort to methods “characterised by deduction from previous cases and 
precedents and reinterpretation of existing judgments.” This reliance on documentation from 
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previous cases in forming judgments on new cases draws attention to the role of people-to-
document KM systems in the delivery of professional legal advice. Such systems seem 
compatible with lawyers’ “epistemic culture” (Knorr Cetina 1999): “where knowledge is highly 
interpretable and contested, knowledge creation is grounded within, and relies far more [than in 
other professional fields] upon an explicit knowledge base articulated in text-based forms” 
(Robertson et al. 2003: 852-853). 
 
Data collection and analysis was carried out from 1999 to 2008 in the Parisian office of a 
large PSF which was a member of an international network of accountants, lawyers and 
consultants. In order to protect the anonymity of the subject organisation, I refer to the office as 
“JurisParis”, and its network member organisation as “JurisFrance”.  
 
JurisParis employs 250 lawyers (and close to 50 people in support functions such as IT, 
secretarial services, and knowledge management), and is one of the principal offices of 
JurisFrance, which employs some 2000 lawyers. Clients of JurisParis consist mainly of large 
French companies, many with foreign operations; often, these clients are referred to the office by 
colleagues in correspondent firms within the global network in which JurisFrance is a member.  
 
Legal work in JurisParis falls mainly into three categories: (a) answering questions from 
clients (ranging from one-off engagements to long-term, ongoing client assistance over several 
years); (b) the administrative management of client files (e.g., statements of time spent, 
production of invoices, collection of payment, etc.); and (c) “development”, an activity aimed at 
improving the firm’s infrastructure. Given the international orientation of its client list, many of 
JurisParis’ lawyers specialise in legal and tax advice relevant to cross-border operations. This 
study examines (a), with a particular emphasis upon the role (if any) of the firm’s KM system in 
the provision of tax and/or legal opinion letters.  
 
JurisParis has made a significant investment in knowledge management resources. Two 
people are employed full-time to ensure the continuing maintenance, development, user training 
and technical support of a range of information and communication technologies, including the 
firm’s own KM system. Known in-house as “knowledge base”, the system was developed in 
1999 using Lotus Domino software, and contains more than 20,000 documents. Using a search 
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engine, users can access legal documents from previous client engagements, such as contracts, 
opinion letters, memoranda, presentations and reports. A number of these have been classified by 
an internal standards committee as representing “best practice”. 
 
Initial contact with the managing partner of JurisParis indicated that knowledge 
management is considered to be an essential aspect of the firm’s survival, with the primary 
purpose of the KM system to improve the technical quality of work. However, an analysis of the 
firm’s annual business plans, and the firm’s annual reviews of its KM function for the period 
1999-2008, indicate that the purpose of the KM system has changed over time. Its initial 
objective has gradually been supplanted by an emphasis upon productivity gains and cost 
efficiency.  
 
The significance of the KM system within JurisParis is demonstrated by the surveillance 
processes employed by the firm to ensure that it is used. Document downloads are monitored by 
the firm’s Knowledge Manager and reported to the managing partner several times each month. 
Use of the system is compulsory: firm policy dictates that if a lawyer does not use appropriate 
templates and other relevant resources from the database they may be subject to disciplinary 
proceedings, and would not be covered by the firm’s liability insurance if a client were to sue for 
negligent advice. Although client-initiated litigation is rare, its adverse consequences are a 
significant motivation for compliance. In addition, lawyers’ annual assessments (which have a 
direct impact on their career progression and salary) include criteria which take account of time 
allocated to KM activities although, as the managing partner conceded, these criteria have only a 
negligible effect on lawyers’ salaries.  
Study data  
A number of data sources were subject to analysis: 
• Interviews. I identified 12 tax and consultancy engagements which were representative of 
the issues typically addressed by the firm. For each of these, I spoke with the lead partner, 
principal manager, and the junior lawyer charged with researching the issues pertinent to 
the eventual opinion letter or report. Other individuals were interviewed if they had a 
significant role in the engagement. A total of fifty-one interviews with 41 employees were 
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undertaken between 2005 and 2008. In addition, the managing partner of JurisParis was 
interviewed three times during this period. 
• Personal reflections. My own experience as the firm’s Knowledge Manager between 1999 
and 2005.  
• Electronic and archival documents. I examined the document downloads from the KM 
system over a three-month period (February to April 2005), totalling 18,336 observations. 
In addition, I obtained access to 30 archival documents from the period 1999-2008, 
including model lawyer objective sheets for each hierarchical level of the firm, and 
knowledge management activity reports prepared by the partners responsible for KM 
supervision. 
• Non-participant Observation. I attended 7 meetings, during which discussions were held 
regarding the selection of knowledge resources to be added to the KM system.  
Analysis and coding 
 
Data sources were analyzed and coded with NVivo 7. Consistent with an abductive analysis, 
codes emerged and were revised as data was gathered, or were drawn from conceptual 
frameworks derived from a literature review conducted both before and during the data 
collection. In particular, the analysis was mindful of Orlikowski’s (1992) assertion that 
technology cannot have a social effect unless it is utilised. She argues that users are creative and 
do not always follow a technology’s prescribed uses. Rather, they are frequently agents of 
change, who circumvent its prescribed uses or apply a technology in imaginative ways to 
unanticipated situations. As I describe below, the purpose of the KM system as defined by the 
firm’s management committee was not always consistent with its actual use by JurisParis’ 
lawyers.  
Results 
Uses of the KM system by lawyers in JurisParis 
 
Data analysis revealed a typology of uses and non-uses of the KM system at JurisParis.  
 
(1) To find ready-made answers to known questions of law  
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Lawyers often search the KM database to find documents which have been used in similar 
situations to the one they face, or to find out if a specific legal question has previously been 
addressed by another lawyer. If a document or opinion letter is relevant and appropriate to their 
client’s case, most of the lawyers interviewed for this study said that they would reuse existing 
templates or answers rather than formulating solutions from scratch 
 
(2) To identify leads for developing answers to new questions of law 
Users who cannot find an appropriate document or solution often decide to proceed on the 
basis that their query is a novel one, which requires the preparation of an original answer. In such 
a situation, lawyers indicated that they frequently turn to their personal network of legal contacts 
in order to generate leads for developing their answers. In addition, they may use the KM system 
as a resource to identify those individuals within the firm who may have the expertise to suggest 
possible routes to a solution. 
 
(3) For self-training or future reference  
A third type of KM system use is self-training. Whilst searching for ready-made answers 
or leads for new analyses, users often identify documents of interest which, although not 
immediately relevant to their current search, may be of use in the future or as a source of 
information about a point of law or practice. Users download these to their personal libraries for 
later use or referenceix. 
 
(4) To observe and monitor peers’ work 
The author’s prior employment in the firm, and her close relationship with some of its 
lawyers, resulted in confessions of a clandestine practice: scrutinizing what colleagues were 
working on. More specifically, a number of lawyers admitted that they would examine the 
documents entered into the KM system by a colleague in order to evaluate their technical quality 
and whether they contained inaccuracies. This type of use is far removed from the uses 
recommended or anticipated by the system designers or the managers of JurisParis. For some 
lawyers, this practice was a way of monitoring the activities of their rivals, or a means of 
gathering evidence to undermine them. Some users claimed that checking up on others was a way 
of policing whether they were “poaching” on technical fields outside of their recognised area of 
expertise or declared specialisation in the firm’s matrix structure. 
 15 
 
(5) Use of the KM system – or deliberate non-use – to territorialise knowledge  
JurisParis maintains a list of lawyers’ technical and sector-specific specialisations, which 
is published in its client brochure. However the list is not static: a number of internal working 
parties meet regularly to discuss the creation and colonisation of new practice areas. When these 
groups agree that a corpus of knowledge has been developed which is substantial enough to 
support the creation of a new practice group, the group tends to claim exclusive ownership and 
use of the knowledge resources associated with their sphere of expertise. This research reveals 
that, in terms of the use of the KM system, members of newly-formed practice groups 
demonstrate one of two types of response. The first is to put their specialist resources “on 
display”, with the aim of attracting recognition from other members of the firm and securing their 
rights of ownership and exclusive use over this knowledge. The second strategy is to boycott the 
KM system, i.e., restrict the use of their accumulated knowledge resources only to those who 
claim expertise in that area. To prevent knowledge from leaving the group’s “territory”, members 
do not contribute to the central KM system. This results in the creation of a “black market” in 
specialist knowledge, which passes between a select group of lawyers but is outside the 
boundaries of the official knowledge market of the KM system. Thus, whilst one type of 
behaviour is a territorialisation strategy designed to protect knowledge within a social niche, the 
other is a form of deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation whereby knowledge is made accessible to 
the entire firm in order to demonstrate expertise of the author and establish his legitimacy.  
 
Lawyers were also categorised by the frequency of their use of the KM system (moderate 
or intensive user, or non-user), and on their expressed enthusiasm or hostility to it. Frequency of 
individual use was assessed according to the number of documents downloaded by each lawyer, 
as compared with the average number of downloads undertaken by their peers. Enthusiasm or 
hostility towards the KM system was determined from analysis of interview data. Enthusiasts 
were those who made no (or minor) criticism of the database (e.g., poor design, lack of 
functionality), whereas hostile users were those who expressed more severe disparagement, such 
as questioning the rationale for the system, or vilification of its use and effects.  
   ___________________________ 
Table 1 about here 
   ___________________________ 
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In the following section I set out some of the implications of these results; in particular, I 
consider how the various uses of the KM system, and individual variations in use and enthusiasm, 
may affect the firm’s control over the production, sharing and use of knowledge.  
The evolving nature of knowledge control  
 
Control over the knowledge production process 
 
Use of the KM system to find existing answers to common questions, or to identify a 
course for tackling new ones, has resulted in the development of an unforeseen application: the 
ability of users to check what others within the firm may have written on a particular question of 
law. The systematic downloading and appraisal of documents created by colleagues encourages 
individual professionals to align their legal opinions and advisory style with that of peers and 
seniors. Despite the fact that some legal topics may be subject to varying and even contradictory 
interpretations, widespread observation of what others have said results in a standardisation of 
individual professional judgments across the firm. Such a result is congruent with the 
bureaucratic objective originally envisaged for the KM system: that professional knowledge 
production and delivery should be standardised in order to improve cost-efficiency and 
productivity. However, this alignment of legal opinion was not obtained by administrative 
controls, but emerged as an unforeseen result of individual lawyers’ use of the KM system.  
 
Although administrative, coercive controls exist to compel the use of the KM system to 
produce consistent legal advice, these have little or no force because JurisParis has no way of 
knowing whether or not a lawyer has produced an original document or opinion letter, or has 
reused and adapted an existing document available in the KM system. Lawyers themselves have 
internalised the bureaucratic need to standardise their opinion letters and other documents, and to 
check what others have written before formulating their advice. Their self-regulation has thus not 
lost ground to the bureaucracy of the KM system. Indeed, lawyers’ control over the quality of 
their work has become more sophisticated: it is no longer solely concerned with the self-
discipline to behave “professionally”, but has been extended to include a concern not to engage in 
the unnecessary duplication of extant knowledge. By not “reinventing the wheel” for every client 
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engagement, professionals act to minimise the risk of technical errors appearing in work outputs, 
and ensure that their time is utilised in the most cost-efficient way.  
 
I also propose that lawyers’ creative use of the KM system for self-training or to 
“territorialise”/”deterritorialise” their expertise has influenced how knowledge is produced and 
used. Individuals no longer operate as “general practitioners”, but are increasingly creating 
specialised knowledge spaces which become incorporated into the search algorithms and 
taxonomy of the KM system. The bureaucratic thesis advocates that increasing specialisation of a 
workforce creates productivity improvements, yet administrative controls such as formal rewards 
and sanctions were not responsible for the increase in lawyers’ specialisation at JurisParis. 
Rather, it was their self-imposed social controls and norms, played out in the arena of the KM 
system, which created social pressure to maintain their specialist fields and not stray into those of 
their colleagues. This new form of social control was revealed by lawyers’ tendency to observe 
and monitor peers’ work, and to check that their contributions to the KM system were solely 
within a specific individual’s recognised area of expertise. In this way, lawyers could police their 
own knowledge jurisdictions and deter others from encroaching on them.  
 
The KM system can also be used to assess the technical capabilities of others’ work, 
which adds a layer of quality control to the firm’s professional output. Because the KM system 
makes errors visible to the entire firm, lawyers attempt to produce flawless work so that their 
reputations are not tarnished publicly. Again, the KM system operates indirectly to improve the 
quality and consistency of the firm’s client service by encouraging professional self-monitoring 
without the need to impose formal administrative controls.  
 
Thus, although the KM system was implemented in order to increase bureaucratic controls 
over professional work by improving lawyers’ productivity and cost effectiveness, these 
outcomes have been achieved without applying administrative controls. Work standardisation, 
specialisation, and technical reliability were achieved because new forms of social and self-
regulation emerged as the system was used, as demonstrated by lawyers’ anticipated and 
unanticipated uses of the KM system. Professional social and self-controls have not been 




Control of the knowledge sharing process 
 
 Before the implementation of the KM system, knowledge sharing occurred 
informally between individuals and was determined to a large extent by their personal network 
ties and position with the firm’s self-constituted social niches. Sharing now occurs (although not 
exclusively) via the centralised system. Although the new technology has not eradicated the 
traditional distribution channels, it has created new ones. Lawyers are now able to access 
knowledge despite a lack of social capital. Maxine, for example, a newly recruited lawyer, used 
the KM system because she was unable to consult personal contacts within the firm to advise her 
on matters of law:  
 
Maxine, Manager – You think and think, you can’t see any answers so then you look into 
the base [KM] to see whether someone has already written something that could help you 
move ahead in your analysis. […] 
(Interviewer) – When you get stuck on a technical point, what’s your procedure, to look in 
the base [KMS] first or to ask colleagues for assistance? 
Maxine, Manager – I do sometimes look in the base before going to see the others. Yes, of 
course I do. Asking the others is really…well I think the idea is stupid, but there you 
go…it’s really the last resort. 
 
Other lawyers are keen to demonstrate their personal resourcefulness and research 
abilities, without the aid of colleagues. As Matthieu explained: 
 
Matthieu - Supervisor – My job, you know, my job is to use my brains to find solutions to 
problems. It’s not to ask someone else or the knowledge base to do the job for me!  
 
Use of the KM system has allowed lawyers to bypass established and exclusive social 
niches in their search for expert knowledge. Yet the findings of this study indicate that the 
creation of a centralised knowledge sharing system need not be accompanied by a greater 
emphasis on administrative controls. I find that professionals are inclined to regulate themselves, 
and to apply social sanction to those who do not agree to share their knowledge resources. James, 
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the firm’s managing partner, explained that he was confident that a “natural” peer pressure 
mechanism would eventually isolate individuals who did not conform to the new regime. He also 
acknowledged that self-monitoring and regulation of the system by professionals had drawbacks, 
notably some feelings of inequity about the relative contributions to the database by some of its 
contributors and users: 
 
James, Managing Partner – The types of people who are most involved in the commercial 
side and not much in research always complain that this new mutualisation works against 
them. It’s only logical after all, because they don’t have great awareness of the resources 
they use and the investment of capital needed to produce these resources. You see the 
same thing in other professions [...]. In contrast, specialists are very sensitive to the 
looting of their work. They consider that when they’ve developed a product, it should be 
their job to sell it. (…) I think they are against reuse by anyone other than themselves. If I 
carry out a study and no one uses it, I grumble about it. If I carry out a study and I'm told 
it has to be used by everyone and I grumble about that too, then we're at a dead end!  
 
 In summary, I find that the knowledge sharing process at JurisParis is now partially 
bureaucratised, in that it is centralised, searchable and subject to scrutiny by committees of 
experts who decide on what is “best practice”. Although “black markets” for knowledge exist, 
they do not prevent the majority of tax and legal opinion letters from being shared via the central 
KM system. This new, bureaucratised sharing process did not require the imposition of increased 
administrative controls; rather, professionals have remained in direct control of their knowledge 
resources, and continue to decide what they share or do not share. I suggest that most lawyers use 
the KM system even if they fundamentally disagree with the idea of centralised knowledge 
sharing (see Table 1, “Hostile Users”) because new forms of social and self-regulation have 
evolved to produce a set of institutionalised behavioural norms. If a professional does not play by 
the new rules and avoids posting their outputs to the central KM system, he is perceived by his 
peers as being a mere consumer of others’ ideas. To prove their competence, lawyers are 
expected to display their work; to refuse to do so is suspicious and attracts disapproval. My 
analysis found only one lawyer who refused to use the KM system at all (see Table 1, 
“Boycotter”), and even those who were most hostile to the system were occasional users (see 
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Table 1, “Frustrated” and “Schizophrenic” profiles). This suggests that resistance to knowledge 
sharing is isolated.  
 
Control of the knowledge use process 
 
The reuse of personal documents and opinion letters has always happened within 
JurisParis, but the new KM system means that lawyers can reuse resources produced by others, 
without having been involved in their production or knowing the authors. The firm’s managing 
partner explained that he wanted work outputs to be consistent and of high technical quality, and 
for lawyers to avoid duplicating existing documents and research efforts; however, these largely 
bureaucratic objectives were achieved without applying administrative controls over the use of 
the KM system. Although there appeared to be a type of formal, bureaucratic sanction in place -
i.e., the threat of personal legal liability for lawyers who did not use the firm’s authorised 
templates and other knowledge resources, this threat did not materialise during the observation 
period of this study (almost ten years), and may not have exerted any influence upon the 
behaviour of lawyers at JurisParis. In effect, individuals could decide for themselves if and how 
they wanted to use the KM system. Nevertheless, most indicated that they felt compelled to reuse 
existing documents and advisory opinions, even if they disagreed with the very idea of doing 
“copy-and-paste” jobs. A tax partner, for example, explained that reusing materials from past 
engagements was one of the least satisfying aspects of his work. At the same time, he felt that the 
firm was making progress in its approach to producing “standard types of engagements”: 
 
Hyppolite, Partner – My job is to analyze a given situation, and to be able to say, “here is 
what you could do, here are the possibilities that you have.” Given the constraints of a 
particular client question, we have to find the solution that would be most suitable. That’s 
what I like about my job. That’s what I find interesting. Currently, in our profession, law 
firms like ours…you know…we are transforming ourselves into mere suppliers of 
products, of pre-packaged solutions, and we increasingly use ordinary commercial 
techniques.  
Researcher – Since when did you notice this evolution? 
Hyppolite, Partner –About five years ago. And it is an irreversible phenomenon. In fact, in 
France we are even lagging behind on this. 
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Researcher – Was this evolution imposed by the market, do you think, or was it the result 
of some sort of internal strategy, at JurisParis? 
Hyppolite, Partner – Well, both. Clients find their interest in all this. They get more for 
less. We have no choice. What is sad is that, when you write, you sharpen your thoughts; 
the drafting phase is of primary importance because it is by writing your conclusions that 
you realise what the weak points are. If all you do is just copy-and-pastes, you miss that. 
[…] Personally, I rarely use the knowledge base. I never find anything in it. I ask the 
young ones and they find things, most of the time. Including my own work, things that I 
had forgotten! […] On the standard types of engagements, we have made lots of progress.  
 
The rationale behind reusing existing knowledge includes improving cost-efficiency, 
productivity and, ultimately, profits. However, client invoices and calculations of an 
engagement’s profitability (“realisation rate”) rarely took account of the costs of the initial 
production of resources downloaded and reused in the production of an opinion letter or project 
document. Indeed, productivity gains achieved via the large-scale reuse of documents contained 
in the KM system are essentially redistributed to clients free of charge, since most clients are 
invoiced on the basis of “billable hours” spent by the lawyers involved on that particular 
engagement.  
 
The other rationale for reusing existing knowledge and standard form templates is that this 
reduces the risk that technical errors are introduced into documents as they are produced afresh. 
However, some users were sceptical about the technical reliability of some of the documents and 
solutions in the database. A typical concern shared by the majority of lawyers was doubt as to 
whether the tax and legal advice found in the KM system had been proven. These misgivings call 
into question the ability of the database to provide reliable, high quality knowledge solutions.  
 
My analysis of the usage statistics for the KM system, and of the comments of 
interviewees, suggests that knowledge reuse has become more systematised since the system was 
introduced, particularly amongst lawyers with less than 5 years of experiencex. However, the 
efficient and methodical reuse of best practice solutions did not result from lawyers’ fear of 
administrative sanctions. Most had internalised the need to be more productive and cost-efficient, 
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and were using the KM system regardless of their level of enthusiasm or hostility towards it (see 
Table 1). 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
This study examined whether the use of codified people-to-document KM systems in 
bureaucratised PSFs has caused in shift in power away from professional self-regulation and 
monitoring in favour of increased administrative controls over the creation, sharing and use of 
knowledge. A socio-ethnographic study of a large Parisian law firm indicated that using a KM 
system contributes to a bureaucratisation of knowledge production, sharing and use processes, but 
is not accompanied by a concomitant shift in the balance of controls within the firm. Tighter 
administrative controls were not necessary. Far from losing ground to bureaucratic rules, 
professionals adopted self-imposed controls to regulate the use of knowledge within the firm. 
They were able to align their behaviour with managerial goals intended to enhance transparency, 
accountability and cost-efficiency, but at the same time retain their independence within a 
bureaucratised setting.  
 
This research makes three important contributions. First, it adds to the professional-
bureaucratic conflict debate by suggesting that professionals, who have historically resisted any 
bureaucratic constraint (Raelin 1985), are now, in certain settings, actively participating in the 
bureaucratisation of their own knowledge production, sharing and use. Given that the success of 
people-to-document KM projects depends upon professionals’ willingness to codify and share 
their work outputs widely which may diminish their professional power why do they actively 
embrace such systems? Why are they promoting the very mechanisms that might limit their 
autonomy?  
 
One plausible explanation could be that the bureaucratisation of knowledge production, 
sharing and use actually facilitates professional power. In particular, transparency might assist in 
addressing increasing public mistrust of professional judgments, which have been accused of 
being subjective, arbitrary and untrustworthy. By adopting a more systematic, scientific approach 
to problems, and producing more consistent solutions to the same problem, professionals’ work 
becomes more reliable and auditable, which is likely to increase public confidence in 
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professionals’ work. This suggestion concurs with the views of Bastard et al. (2005) and Castel 
and Merle (2002), who claim that standards, norms and other administrative constraints, which 
initially appear to be rationalisations or bureaucratic emanations limiting professional discretion 
and autonomy, are actually resources that can be used to improve the reputation of professionals. 
In addition, if KM systems could be used to find solutions which could be sold to clients, then 
professionals’ powers are in fact increased rather than diluted. If so, one could argue that 
bureaucracy does not always crush individual agents’ powers and creativity, but rather it 
redefines where their powers and creativity can be applied.  
 
Further, I note that a shift away from the old “exclusionary regime of knowledge” (Knorr 
Cetina 2006) toward a more inclusive, accessible system is of benefit to those previously 
excluded from accessing knowledge resources. Individuals formerly disenfranchised by a lack of 
social capital or network associations can now use KM systems to access powerful knowledge 
resources, and to demonstrate their own abilities to create and colonise knowledge. Given the 
significance of this revolution for both the old guard and the new generation, it is not surprising 
that this power reconfiguration finds both supporters and opponents. 
 
Another possible explanation for professionals’ active participation in the 
bureaucratisation of knowledge production, sharing and use is that their acceptance of such 
projects might not trigger the classic professional-bureaucratic conflict that the extant literature 
proposes. It is possible that KM codification projects can be implemented in such a way as to 
satisfy both organisational and individual goals, as suggested by Morris (2001), or that 
professionals are (perhaps dangerously) unaware of conflicts between professional and 
bureaucratic objectives and values (Suddaby, Gendron and Lam 2009). The extent to which self- 
and peer-imposed control mechanisms are resisted or not, and the extent to which professionals 
unwittingly or consciously accept the principles of bureaucratic control, remain to be determined 
in future studies.  
 
A second contribution from the results of this research is to expand upon current 
conceptualisations of organisational control archetypes. Extant literature suggests that 
administrative controls are necessarily formal and cybernetic, and always use clear reward and 
sanction procedures. In this study, however, an increase in the appearance of administrative 
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control (e.g., through repeated verbal injunctions, by the firm’s managing partner, to re-use best 
practice solutions to known questions of law) was observed, but no formal sanctions or clear 
reward system was in place. Despite their reported personal preference for autonomy and 
discretion in the performance of their work, most professionals felt compelled to change their 
behaviour in relation to the production, sharing and use of knowledge. Should one infer that a 
facade of administrative control can be effective in encouraging certain desired behaviours? 
Further investigations are needed. The results of this study suggest that the bureaucratisation of 
PSFs influences not only their internal mix of self, social and administrative controls, but also the 
content of each of these three modes of control. Studying how each control vector changes over 
time opens up new research possibilities. More work is also necessary to understand how and 
why the targets of organisational supervision become either consciously or inadvertently involved 
in the structuring of their own surveillance.  
 
Thirdly, the results of this study contribute to the organisational archetype literature by 
suggesting that the bureaucratisation of professional firms and the imposition of administrative 
controls are not necessarily linked. This research found that the control of knowledge production, 
sharing and use at JurisParis remained largely informal, despite the application of bureaucratic 
processes. This may imply that PSFs might not need more explicit regimes of governance and 
control, even if they are attempting to increase their productivity and cost efficiency and to 
become more “managerial”. More research is needed to answer this question. 
 
This study suggests that new regimes of professional knowledge production, sharing, use 
and control are emerging in some PSFs. These regimes are facilitated by technology, but 
professionals still play the most significant role in creating, applying and distributing knowledge 
resources. Even though work environments are becoming more rationalised and mechanised, the 
essence of professional work is still the largely intangible application of individual creativity, 
experience and judgment. Because professionals retain their autonomy and discretion, they have 
remained free to devise novel and unanticipated uses for the technology. Moreover, management 
instruments such as KM systems are arguably facilitating professional work rather than directing 
it, which has produced benefits in terms of quality, productivity and efficiency for both individual 
professionals and PSF managers. This study seems to indicate that professional work is 
transforming itself and that “decustomisation” – in the sense of recycling existing knowledge by 
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creatively adapting it to novel contexts is a form of behaviour which has previously been 
overlooked in PSF research. But given that decustomisation is now so prevalent in large PSFs, 
can they still be defined as organisations that “apply complex knowledge to non-routine 
problems” (Morris and Empson 1998: 610)? More broadly, will such decustomisation lead to 
“fissuring the professional-knowledge-power knot” (Kuhlmann and Burau 2008) in society? The 
bureaucratisation of PSFs presents a number of opportunities for scholarly research and debate 
regarding the definition of professional work, and it remains to be seen how well professionals 
maintain their autonomy and power whilst dealing with bureaucratic demands to produce better, 
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(Pierre, Partner) - “Me? 
No. I never use it directly. 
I ask [name of a junior 
lawyer] to go and find 
stuff in it for me. 
Because, you know, I 
always forget my 
password.” 
(Hélène, Junior) – “Well, if 
it’s something repetitive, 
well known and if there are 
models available, I am not 
going to recreate things from 
scratch. That would be 
totally stupid, and a waste of 
time […]. The 
knowledgebase is very 
important, you know. When I 
did my job interviews, it’s 
something that I considered. 
Not something fundamental 
but important. Because there 
are law firms where you get 
nothing like this.” 
(Frank, Senior Manager) – “I 
generally find what I am 
looking for [in the KMS]. 
‘Boiler-plate’ clauses, for 
instance, which we find in 
every contract [...]. You read 
them, and if they look all 
right, all you have to do is 















(Bertrand, Partner) - “I 
have never ever opened 
the database. You can 
check it out if you want.” 
(Researcher) – “But do 
you prescribe its use to 
the juniors with whom 
you work?” 
(Bertrand, Tax Partner) – 
“No. It’s their problem if 
they want to use it.” 
(Henri, Director) – Am I a 
user of the knowledgebase? 
Only under duress […] My 
feeling is that this database 
is useless. […] The whole 
thing is messed up. […] It 
was supposed to be for 
knowledge sharing but he 
[the firm’s managing 
partner] uses it for policing 
people.” 
(Sabine, Senior Manager) – 
I use certain things in the 
knowledgebase, especially 
when I work with [name of 
a partner whom we did not 
interview], but only things 
written by people I know 
and trust. […] Because the 
database is loaded with 
errors. You find lots of 
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i
 First generation KM systems are also referred to as “people-to-document” KM systems in the literature (Hansen et 
al. 1999). 
ii
 Other researchers who have analyzed the evolution of control types in the context of professional services have 
used similar typologies. For example, Kuhlmann and Burau (2008) used the classification “hierarchy, network and 
self-regulation”, which is very similar to Hopwood’s (1974) scheme. 
iii
 Production technology refers to “the actions that an individual performs on an object, with or without the aid of 
tools or mechanical devices, in order to make some change in that object. The object [...] may be a living being, 
human or otherwise, a symbol or an inanimate object.” (Perrow 1967: 195-196). 
iv
 Abbott (1988: 40) explains that professional work always consists of three phases: “diagnosis, inference and 
treatment.” 
v
 Abbott (1988) prefers to use the expression “professional knowing”, rather than “professional knowledge”, since 
the latter implies that knowledge is reified but the former better suggests its transitory nature and its continual 
enactment and re-enactment each time it is applied. However, for the sake of readability and simplicity, this paper 
uses the term “professional knowledge” consistent with its common sense meaning. 
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vi
 Note that Suddaby and Greenwood (2001) refer to “management knowledge” commodification in their paper, 
rather than “professional knowledge” commodification. 
viiAn ongoing debate in the knowledge management literature concerns the definition of organisational knowledge 
(Hsiao et al. 2006). Is organisational knowledge a commodity, a mode of cognition or a capability? This paper does 
not attempt to resolve this epistemological dispute. Rather, it analyses the use of first-generation KM systems, which 
view organisational knowledge as a commodity. Consistently, “knowledge” is referred to as the codifiable output of 
a learning process. The analytical dichotomy between knowing as a process and knowledge as an output of that 
process does not necessarily imply an ontological separation between the two. 
viii
 Freidson (1986: 213), citing Wilding (1982), identifies various areas in which power can be exercised by 
professionals: “[t]here is power in policy making and administration, power to define public needs and problems, 
power in resource-allocation, power over clients, and power to control work”. Because ordinary members of the 
professions – such as the lawyers interviewed for this study are not typically involved in policy making, 
administration or defining public needs, this study focuses on professionals’ power to exclusively control their work 
outputs. 
ix
 Constructing a personal database from the KM system distorts system use statistics, because once a downloaded 
document is stored on a local hard disk, it can be reused any number of times without that use being acknowledged 
and measured.  
x
 In 2005, the average number of documents downloaded per lawyer per month was 38 for juniors, 77 for seniors, 50 
for supervisors, 20 for managers, 7 for senior managers, 4 for directors and 5 for partners. 
 
 
